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Are You Misappropriating Client Funds?
Missouri's IOLTA Plan After Mottl
Mottl v. Missouri Lawyer Trust Account Foundation'
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of Missouri's Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts
("IOLTA") program, expounded in Rule 4-1.15,2 is "to provide a source of
funds for civil legal services to the poor, improve the administration of jus-
tice, and promote other programs for the benefit of the public." 3 Client funds
placed into IOLTA accounts by Missouri attorneys earn interest that is remit-
ted to the Missouri Lawyer Trust Account Foundation ("Foundation") to be
disbursed to organizations that fulfill IOLTA's purposes.4 Attorneys in Mis-
souri are required to participate in the IOLTA program unless they meet a
stated exception or choose to opt out of the program each year.
5
In Mottl v. Missouri Lawyer Trust Account Foundation, the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Western District addressed the constitutionality of
Missouri's IOLTA program for the first time and held that participation in
Missouri's IOLTA program is not state action because of the voluntary nature
of the program. 6 By so deciding, the court shifted liability for participation in
the program from the state to private attorneys and law firms. As a result, an
attorney must inform a client during initial consultation that the attorney or
the attorney's firm voluntarily participates in the IOLTA program and that, as
a result of this participation, the interest on client funds that is nominal in
amount or held for a short period of time will be transferred to the Founda-
tion.7 Attorneys who fail to do so subject themselves to liability to the client
for conversion of the client's interest and to possible disciplinary sanctions.8
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Mottl arose in 2002, when Robert Mottl filed a class action petition
against the Foundation and the judges of the Missouri Supreme Court.9 Mottl
1. 133 S.W.3d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 346 (2004).
2. MO. SUP. CT. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.15.
3. Id. at 4-1.15 cmt.
4. Id. at 4-1.15(d)(4), (g)(2).
5. Id. at 4-1.15(e), (f).
6. Mott, 133 S.W.3d at 147.
7. See infra notes 150-152 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 134-149 and accompanying text.
9. Mottl, 133 S.W.3d at 143-44. The judges of the Missouri Supreme Court
named in the suit were "the Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., the Honorable
1
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alleged that his attorney, Robert Heggie, deposited $3,600 of Mottl's funds
into an IOLTA account (the interest on which the Foundation collected) and
that Mottl did not wish to have his funds so deposited.' 0 Mottl sought a decla-
ration that the retention and use of the IOLTA interest collected by the Foun-
dation was an unconstitutional taking of private property "without just com-
pensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments" to the United
States Constitution. 1 Additionally, Mottl sought injunctive and monetary
relief on behalf of himself and a class of other clients whose attorneys had
placed funds into IOLTA accounts.'
2
The Foundation and the Supreme Court judges filed motions to dismiss
on the ground that the deposit of client funds into an IOLTA account did not
constitute state action due to the voluntary nature of Missouri's IOLTA pro-
gram. ' 3 Argument and hearing on the motions to dismiss were stayed pending
the United States Supreme Court's decision on the constitutionality of Wash-
ington's IOLTA program.' 4 Following the decision in Brown v. Legal Foun-
dation of Washington in 2003, which upheld the Washington program, 15 the
judges of the Missouri Supreme Court "filed a supplemental memorandum in
support of their motion to dismiss," arguing the Missouri rule was materially
the same as the Washington rule.'
6
After a hearing on the motions, the trial court "dismiss[ed] Mottl's peti-
tion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."'17 The trial
court reasoned that because Rule 4-1.15 was similar to the Washington rule
permitting client funds to be placed in an IOLTA account only when the
funds were incapable of eaming net interest for the client, the client suffered
no loss as a result of the Rule, and therefore, the just compensation due Mottl
would be zero. '8 In addition, the trial court ruled that because of the voluntary
nature of the Missouri IOLTA program, Mottl could not prove the requisite
state action to support his constitutional claim. ' 9
Duane Benton, the Honorable William Ray Price, Jr., the Honorable Ronnie L. White,
the Honorable Michael A. Wolff, the Honorable Laura Denvir Stith, and the Honor-
able Richard B. Teitelman." Id.
10. Id. at 144.
11. Id.
12. Id. Mottl filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
13. Id. at 144-45. The Supreme Court judges alternatively argued "they were
entitled to legislative immunity for promulgating the [Supreme Court] [R]ule" estab-
lishing Missouri's IOLTA program. Id. at 145 n.2. In addition, the judges argued that,
if the court found that state action was present, Mottl's attorney must be a "state actor
and [must be] joined as an indispensable party" to the action. Id.
14. Id. at 145.
15. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
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Mottl appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western Dis-
trict. 20 The appellate court found that because of the voluntary nature of Mis-
souri's IOLTA program, the decision to participate in the program "is in the
hands of the attorney or law firm and ultimately the client who selects his
attorney."21 Thus, the court held that the deposit of client funds into an
IOLTA account and the subsequent transfer of the earned interest to the
Foundation is private action which cannot fairly be attributed to the State.22
Thus, Missouri's IOLTA program is not an unconstitutional taking of private
property without just compensation.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. IOLTA History
Congress paved the way for state IOLTA programs in 1980 when it au-
thorized the creation of Negotiable Order of Withdrawal ("NOW") accounts,
which allowed federally insured banks to disburse interest on demand depos-
its for the first time.23 NOW accounts may not accrue interest if held by for-
profit corporations or partnerships unless the for-profit corporation or part-
nership holds funds in trust for a charitable organization that has "the exclu-
sive right to the interest." 24 The interest is not treated as client income for
federal income tax purposes25 so long as the interest is subject to an IOLTA
program administered by the state and "no client may individually elect
whether to participate in the program, 26 or control the disposition of the in-
terest. 27 The attorney or firm must elect whether to participate in the program
as to all of its clients.28 Therefore, an attorney's or firm's election to partici-
pate in the state's IOLTA program is an all-or-nothing decision; if an attorney
or firm chooses to participate in the program, an attorney's or firm's clients
may not choose not to participate on an individual basis.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 147.
22. Id.
23. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 161 (1998) (citing 12 U.S.C. §
1832 (2000)).
24. Id. (citing a Letter from Federal Reserve Board General Counsel Michael
Bradfield to Donald Middlebrooks (Oct. 15, 1981), reprinted in Donald M. Middle-
brooks, The Interest on Trust Accounts Program: Mechanics of its Operation, 56 FLA.
B.J. 115, 117 (Feb. 1982)). The court deferred to the Federal Reserve Board's inter-
pretation of 12 U.S.C. § 1832, citing Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Phillips, 524 U.S. at 161.
25. Rev. Rul. 87-2, 1987-1 C.B. 18.
26. Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16.
27. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 163.
28. Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16.
2006)
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B. Missouri's IOLTA Program
Missouri's IOLTA program is established in Missouri Supreme Court
Rule 4-1.15, entitled "Safekeeping Property." 29 The purpose of the program is
"to provide a source of funds for civil legal services to the poor, improve the
administration of justice, and promote other programs for the benefit of the
public as are specifically approved from time to time by the Missouri Su-
preme Court for exclusively public purposes." 30 Since the Foundation began
collecting interest revenue in 1985, it has collected and disbursed over $12.5
million to state legal services agencies and other public projects. 3'
Missouri's IOLTA program requires Missouri lawyers to establish and
maintain interest-bearing depository accounts in which to deposit "all funds of
clients or third persons that are nominal in amount or are expected to be held
for a short period of time."32 The interest earned on these trust accounts is to be
available for transfer on demand33 to the Foundation and not to the individual
clients whose funds comprise the account. 34 To determine whether client funds
should be deposited into an IOLTA account, the attorney must consider: (1) the
anticipated amount of interest to be earned during the period in which the funds
are expected to remain in the account, (2) the costs required to establish and
administer the account, (3) and the capability of the financial institution main-
taining the account to calculate and pay interest to individual clients. 35 In de-
termining whether funds will earn net positive interest, the attorney must con-
sider: (1) service charges, (2) accounting fees, (3) tax reporting procedures, (4)
the nature of the transactions involved, (5) the likelihood of delay, and (6) the
costs of delivering the interest to the client, including stamps, envelopes, and
clerical and administrative expenses.36 The attorney is obligated to review the
29. Mo. SuP. CT. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.15.
30. Id. at 4-1.15 cmt.
31. From a Blueprint to a Footprint: After 20 Years, Missouri's IOLTA Program
Continues Building a Legacy of Success, Mo. B. BULL., March 2005, at 9. The largest
amount of money Missouri's IOLTA program has collected in a single year is $1.3
million in 1991. Id. at 8. Falling interest rates have significantly reduced the pro-
gram's revenues in recent years. Id. at 9. In 2003, IOLTA programs around the nation
generated about $200 million. JAMES R. DEVINE ET AL., PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 156 (3d ed. 2004) (citing Alabama Law Foundation's IOLTA Pro-
gram Gets Good News from US. Supreme Court, 64 ALA. LAWYER 261 (2003)).
32. Mo. Sup. CT. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.15(d).
33. Id. at 4-1.15(d)(3).
34. See id. at 4-1.15(d)(4). The interest earned on the IOLTA account is to be
forwarded to the Foundation at least quarter-annually. Id. at 4-1.15(d)(4)(i).
35. Id. at 4-1.15(d)(2).
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account at reasonable intervals to determine if the client funds remain appropri-
ate for deposit in the IOLTA account.
37
Every lawyer in Missouri must certify to the Missouri Supreme Court that
the lawyer or the law firm with which the lawyer is associated either partici-
pates in the IOLTA program or is exempt from participation. 38 There are five
exemptions, 39 the first of which exempts an attorney from participation in the
IOLTA program if the lawyer or law firm's practice, because of its nature, does
not or is not required to maintain trust accounts.4 ° Under the second exemption,
a lawyer is exempt if the lawyer is primarily engaged in practice outside of
Missouri and does not regularly practice law in Missouri.4 1 The third exemption
provides that a lawyer need not participate if the lawyer is part of a law firm
with at least one lawyer admitted to practice in another jurisdiction and the
lawyer or firm maintains a trust account outside of Missouri that remits the
interest earned on such account to the client or third person who owns the fund
or to an organization pursuant to the laws of the other jurisdiction.42 The fourth
exemption allows an attorney to decline to participate by notifying the Founda-
tion in writing on or before January 31 of any year.43 Finally, the Foundation's
Board of Directors may exempt a lawyer from participation.
44
C. Constitutional Challenge
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,45 prohibits the government
from taking private property for public use without just compensation. 46 This
prohibition applies only to state action; it is inapplicable to actions taken by
private parties.47 For a taking to be considered state action, it must be carried
out pursuant to state law and significant state involvement must exist.48 For
37. Mo. SuP. CT. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.15(d)(5).
38. Id. at 4-1.15(e).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 4-1.15(e)(1).
41. Id. at 4-1.15(e)(2).
42. Id. at 4-1.15(e)(3).
43. Id. at 4-1.15(e)(4), (f).
44. Id. at 4-1.15(e)(5).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Philips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156,
163 (1998).
46. U.S CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
47. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982).
48. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 n.9 (1999).
[S]tate action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation "caused
by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule
of conduct imposed by the State or a person for whom the State is respon-
2006]
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"private" action to be attributable to the state, there must exist such a "'close
nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private
behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' ' 49 A state will be
found responsible for the actions of private parties when the state, by law, has
compelled the act.
50
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person may seek relief for the deprivation of
rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution or other law. 51 To
be successful, the plaintiff must prove state action and that the deprivation was
under color of law.52 If the defendant's conduct is deemed state action, then the
conduct is also action "under color of state law" for purposes of section 1983.53
D. Case Law
Although Mottl is the first Missouri case to address the constitutionality
of its IOLTA program, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the
legitimacy of two other states' IOLTA programs.54 In the first case, Phillips
v. Washington Legal Foundation,55 the Court addressed a claim that Texas'
IOLTA program 56 amounted to a taking of private property without just com-
pensation and, thus, violated the Fifth Amendment. 57 The Texas Supreme
Court enacted its IOLTA program via State Bar Rule, providing that "client
funds that are 'nominal in amount or are reasonably anticipated to be held for
a short period of time' must [be placed by an attorney] in a separate, interest-
sible," and that "the party charged with the deprivation must be a person
who may fairly be said to be a state actor."
Id. at 50 (quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
49. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295
(2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
50. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (citation omitted).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
52. Sullivan, 26 U.S. at 50.
53. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295 n.2 (citation omitted).
54. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Phillips v. Wash.
Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
55. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
56. Although Phillips specifically addressed Texas law, the Court cited to
IOLTA programs in other states. Id. at 159-60.
57. Id. at 162. The plaintiffs included the Washington Legal Foundation, "a pub-
lic-interest law and policy center with members in the State of Texas... opposed to
the Texas IOLTA program," a Texas attorney who regularly utilized an IOLTA ac-
count, and a Texas businessman who regularly utilized the services of an attorney. Id.
at 162-63. At the time the case was decided, 49 states and the District of Columbia
had adopted IOLTA programs. Id. at 159-60 n. 1. Indiana was the only state that had
not implemented an IOLTA program. Id. (citing In re Ind. State Bar Ass'n Petition,
550 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. 1990)). By 2003, every state and the District of Columbia had
instituted an IOLTA program. Brown, 538 U.S. at 221.
[Vol. 71
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bearing NOW account (an IOLTA account). 58 The Texas IOLTA program
considered funds to be "nominal in amount" or "held for a short period of
time" if the lawyer holding such funds determined
such funds, considered without regard to funds of other clients
which may be held by the attorney, law firm or professional corpo-
ration, could not reasonably be expected to earn interest for the cli-
ent or if the interest which might be earned on such funds is not
likely to be sufficient to offset the cost of establishing and main-
taining the account, service charges, accounting costs and tax re-
porting costs which would be incurred in attempting to obtain the
interest on such funds for the client.
59
The interest proceeds from each attorney or law firm's IOLTA account were
to be paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation ("TEAJF"), which
distributed the funds to nonprofit organizations which provided legal services
for low income persons.
60
The Court began its analysis of the Fifth Amendment taking issue by
stating that the existence of a property interest is to be determined by state
law.6 1 The court then stated the general rule, dating back to English common
law, that "interest follows principal. 62 Combining these principles, the Court
stated that "as to confiscatory regulations (as opposed to those regulating the
use of property), a State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing
traditional property interests long recognized under state law." 63 Finally, the
Court characterized the Texas rule as a requirement that client funds incapa-
ble of generating net interest be deposited in IOLTA accounts.
64
After characterizing the Texas IOLTA program in this manner, the
Court rejected the view that "a physical item is not 'property' simply because
it lacks a positive economic or market value., 65 The Court found that an
owner has valuable property rights regardless of the fact that no economically
realizable value is gained. 66 The Court also rejected an argument that the in-
58. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 161 (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 162 (citation omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 164 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)).
62. Id. at 165-66 (citing Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 162 (1980)).
63. Id. at 167.
64. Id. at 169.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 170. The Court specifically cited the owner's rights of possession,
control, and disposition as being valuable despite the property's lack of economically
realizable value. Id. The Court analogized the situation at bar to the government seiz-
ing rental income collected by the owner of a building, stating that the government
2006]
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terest earned on the IOLTA accounts is not private property because the interest
generated is "government-created value,68 finding instead that the interest
income is generated by the client's funds.68 Thus, the Court held that interest
income earned on funds placed in IOLTA accounts "is the 'private property' of
the owner of the principal." 69 In so holding, the Court specifically stated that it
expressed no opinion as to whether the funds were taken by the state or as to
the amount of just compensation due the owners of the principal if such a state
taking occurred, leaving those arguments for another day.
70
That day came in 2003, when the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Le-
gal Foundation of Washington.71 In Brown, the plaintiffs72 claimed that the
appropriation of interest earned on Washington IOLTA accounts amounted to
an unconstitutional taking of their private property without just compensa-
tion.73 Washington's IOLTA program had four essential features:
(a) the requirement that all client funds be deposited in interest-
bearing trust accounts, (b) the requirement that funds that cannot
earn net interest for the client be deposited in an IOLTA account,
(c) the requirement that the lawyers direct the banks to pay the net
interest on the IOLTA accounts to the.. . Foundation.... and (d)
the requirement that the Foundation must use all funds received
had no right to seize such funds simply because the rents collected exceeded the costs
incurred by the owner to collect the rent. Id.
67. Id. The Court stated that the interest income was "economically realizable"
by the IOLTA programs because of the federal government's waiver of tax reporting
costs and allowance of interest to be gained on the funds if the funds are remitted to
the state, and that these allowances by the federal government "hardly constitute[]
'government-created value."' Id. at 170-71.
68. Id. at 171.
69. Id. at 172.
70. Id.
71. 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
72. The original plaintiffs in Brown were the Washington Legal Foundation, two
Limited Practice Officers ("LPOs"), and two private individuals who regularly pur-
chased and sold real estate and utilized the services of LPOs. Id. at 227-28 n.4. LPOs
are nonlawyers who temporarily control client funds in their actions as escrowees in
real estate transactions and fall within the provisions of the Washington IOLTA rules.
Id. at 227. The Court of Appeals found that the Washington Legal Fundation and the
two LPOs did not have standing to raise their claims. Id. at 228. The Washington
Legal Foundation, which was a plaintiff in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,
is distinct from the Legal Foundation of Washington, the administrator of the IOLTA
program. Id. at 216, 228; supra note 57.
73. Brown, 538 U.S. at 228-29. The plaintiffs alleged a violation of the Fifth
Amendment, id., applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, supra
note 45. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that having the IOLTA interest proceeds
donated to specific organizations amounted to a forced association with the organiza-
tion in violation of the their First Amendment rights. Brown, 538 U.S. at 228.
[Vol. 71
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from IOLTA accounts for tax-exempt law-related charitable and
74
educational purposes.
Furthermore, Washington's IOLTA funds include "only those funds that can-
not, under any circumstances, earn net interest (after deducting transaction
and administrative costs and bank fees) for the client.",
75
In addressing the takings issue, the Court stated the general rule allow-
ing the state to confiscate private property so long as the taking is for a public
use and just compensation is paid to the owner.76 The Court held that the first
condition, public use, was "unquestionably satisfied.",77 Addressing the sec-
ond condition, the Court found the "consistent and unambiguous holdings" of
prior cases mandated that the just compensation due to the plaintiffs under the





The Court held that the client funds subject to the IOLTA program were
funds that could in no event earn any net return; otherwise, the funds would
not be subject to taking per Washington's IOLTA program. 79 The Court
stated that if a client's funds were capable of earning net interest, the attor-
neys or LPOs would have violated the program rules by depositing them in
the IOLTA account and the client's loss would be the result of private action
instead of state action.8 ° Conversely, if the funds were properly included in
the program, then the just compensation due the plaintiffs for the state taking
of their property in the IOLTA program would be nothing because the funds
would be incapable of earning net interest, and therefore the Court found no
constitutional violation when the plaintiffs were not compensated.
81
After the initial decision in Phillips, the validity of the Missouri IOLTA
plan was thrown into question due to the Supreme Court's ruling that the
interest earned on IOLTA accounts was the clients' property.82 To assuage
this concern, the Missouri Bar's Legal Ethics Counsel advised attorneys in
the state that the IOLTA program was still valid, but that attorneys should
disclose their participation in the program to their clients whose funds may be
74. Brown, 538 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 231-32.
77. Id. at 232. The majority stated that a state's actions in imposing a special tax
to accomplish the same purposes as IOLTA programs would be a legitimate use of the
public's money. Id.
78. Id. at 235-36. The Court quoted Justice Holmes' statement that "the question
is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained." Id. at 236 (quoting Boston
Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)).
79. Id. at 239-40.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 240.
82. From a Blueprint to a Footprint: After 20 Years, Missouri's IOLTA Program
Continues Building a Legacy of Success, Mo. B. BULL., March 2005, at 8.
2006]
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deposited in an IOLTA account. 83 The Counsel's advisory opinion also reit-
erated that only funds to be held for a short period of time or nominal in
amount should be deposited in IOLTA accounts.
84
E. Conversion & Disciplinary Action
"Conversion is the unauthorized assumption and exercise of ownership
rights over the E ersonal property of another party to the exclusion of the
owner's rights." 5 For a successful action based on conversion, a plaintiff
must show: (1) she was either "the owner of the property or entitled to pos-
session of [it], (2) the defendant took possession of the property . . . in-
ten[ding] to exercise ... control over it, and (3) the defendant ... deprived
the plaintiff of [her] right to possess[ ] ... the property."
8 6
An action for conversion is usually not available "for money represented
by a general debt. ' 87 However, where funds are entrusted to another for a
specific purpose and the holder diverts the funds for a use other than that
specified, an action for conversion is available. 88 Accordingly, where funds
are placed with an attorney for a specific purpose by a client and the attorney
uses the funds for a purpose other than that specified, the attorney is subject
to liability for conversion, including possible punitive damages.
89
Furthermore, an attorney who converts or misappropriates a client's
funds is subject to disciplinary action. A lawyer has a duty to remit promptly
to the client or a third person "any funds or other property that the client or
83. Missouri Legal Ethics Counsel Informal Advisory Opinion Number 980201.
84. Id.
85. IOS Capital, LLC v. Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp., 150 S.W.3d 148,
152 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
86. Id. at 153.
87. Dillard v. Payne, 615 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Mo. 1981) (per curiam).
88. Id. "An action will lie for the conversion of money where there is an obliga-
tion to return or otherwise particularly treat specific money." H.D. Warren, Annota-
tion, Nature of Property or Rights Other Than Tangible Chattels Which May Be Sub-
ject of Conversion, 44 A.L.R.2d 927 § 7[a] (1955). "Money delivered for safekeeping,
to which the keeper claims no title and which is required and intended to be kept
segregated, substantially in the form in which it was received... may be the subject
of conversion." Id. § 7[b].
89. Dillard, 615 S.W.2d at 54-55. In Dillard, a client alleged that his attorney
converted $300 which the client advanced to the attorney to be placed in a trust account
for the payment of lawsuit expenses. Id. at 54. The court found that $10 of the advanced
funds was spent on expenses and the attorney converted the remaining $290. Id. The
Missouri Supreme Court found that the plaintiff's petition adequately stated an action
for conversion in that it alleged that the client's funds were placed in the custody of the
attorney for a specific purpose and that the attorney diverted those funds for his own
use. Id. at 55. The court found that these allegations stated a claim for conversion and
that the plaintiff could seek punitive damages from the attorney. Id.
[Vol. 71
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third person is entitled to receive." 90 An attorney misappropriates a client's
funds when the attorney disburses funds in which a client has an interest "for
purposes other than those of the client's interests." 9' The Missouri Supreme
Court has stated that the proper remedy for conversion or misappropriation of
a client's money is disbarment. 92 "Even an unintentional mishandling of cli-
ent funds by an attorney can justify disbarment." 93 However, "[d]isbarment is
the ultimate sanction and should be reserved for a clear case."
94
The Missouri Supreme Court has often looked to the American Bar As-
sociation's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA Standards") for
guidance in determining the proper punishment for an attorney who violates a
duty to a client.95 According to the ABA Standards, admonition is appropriate
when a lawyer negligently handles a client's property, causing little or no
injury to a client.96 Admonition is also appropriate if the attorney engages in
an isolated incidence of negligently failing to accurately and completely in-
form a client causing little or no injury.9 7 Reprimand is appropriate when an
attorney negligently fails to accurately or completely inform a client, causing
injury or potential injury.9
8
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Court of Appeals for the Western District began its opinion by sum-
marizing the facts of the case, the Missouri IOLTA program, and the proce-
dural posture of the case before it.99 The court then addressed the standard of
review. Because the case was disposed of on a motion to dismiss for failure to
90. Mo. SuP. CT. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.15(b).
91. In re Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
92. In re Griffey, 873 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
93. Id.
94. Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d at 6.
95. See, e.g., In re Crews, 159 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Mo. 2005) (en banc) (per cu-
riam); In re Snyder, 35 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Mo. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam); In re
Cupples, 979 S.W.2d 932, 936 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
96. ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 4.14 (1992). "Admoni-
tion, also known as private reprimand, is a form of non-public discipline which de-
clares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to
practice." Id. at 2.6. Negligence involves an attorney's failure to "heed a substantial
risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow," deviating from the standard
of care of a reasonable attorney in the situation. Id. at Definitions.
97. Id. at 4.64.
98. Id. at 4.63. "Reprimand, also known as censure or public censure, is a form
of public discipline which declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not
limit the lawyer's right to practice." Id. at 2.5.
99. Mottl v. Mo. Lawyer Trust Account Found., 133 S.W.3d 142, 143-45 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 346 (2004).
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state a cause of action, the standard of review was de novo.' ° The court next
addressed Mottl's taking claim, which involved a determination of whether
the IOLTA program constituted state action.101
In addressing Mottl's claim, the court first summarized the law concern-
ing takings by the state under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 0 2 The
court reiterated that the prohibition against taking private property without
just compensation does not apply to acts of private parties; it is only offended
by acts of the state.'0 3 The court stated that a plaintiff in an action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 must likewise prove state action.0 4
The court found that, because the transfers of interest from the IOLTA
program to the Foundation were authorized by Supreme Court Rule 4-1.15,
the transfers satisfied the first requirement of the state action test, action taken
pursuant to state law.105 The court then focused on the second inquiry man-
dated by the test: significant state involvement.'0 6 The court looked to "the
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complain[ed]": the deposit of Mottl's
funds by his attorney into an IOLTA account and the transfer of the interest
earned on those funds to the Foundation constituted a taking of his property
without just compensation.' 7 The court identified the primary issue in the
100. Id. at 145. The court stated that all the factual allegations in the plaintiffs'
petition were assumed to be true and favorably construed for the plaintiffs. Id. (citing
Long v. Cross Reporting Serv., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)). "The
petition is reviewed to determine whether it invokes principles of substantive law and
whether the facts alleged, if proven, would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Id. (citing
Long, 103 S.W.3d at 252).
101. Id. at 145-46. Mottl presented two different points on appeal. First, Mottl
claimed the trial court erred in dismissing the case because the Missouri IOLTA plan
did not "unambiguously forbid the deposit into IOLTA accounts of client funds that
could earn net interest," and therefore a trial on the issue of just compensation was
due. Id. at 145. The second claim was that the IOLTA program enacted by Supreme
Court Rule 4-1.15 constituted state action. Id. at 145-46. The court did not address the
first claim because it found the state action claim to be dispositive. Id. at 146.
102. Id. at 146.
103. Id. (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-38 n.6 (1982)).
104. Id. (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)).
105. Id.
106. Id. Mottl argued that this second part of the inquiry need not have been ad-
dressed by the court because the state officials enforcing the rule, the Supreme Court
judges, were joined in the suit. Id. at 147 n.4. The court dismissed this assertion be-
cause Mottl did not allege the judges were overtly involved or jointly participated
with those private persons who took his property without just compensation. Id. Mottl
alleged state action based on the judges creation and enforcement of the rule. Id. The
court stated that the rule must meet the second element of the state action test for its
constitutionality to be addressed pursuant to a section 1983 action. Id.
107. Id. at 147.
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case as "whether these acts of private persons or entities are fairly attributable
to the State."'
0 8
Mottl contended the deposit of his funds into an IOLTA account by his
attorney and the transfer of the interest earned on his funds to the Foundation
were attributable to the state, thus satisfying the second requirement of the
state action test. 10 9 The court noted that action authorized or encouraged by
the state or done with the approval or acquiescence of the state is insufficient
to attribute the conduct to the state." 10 The court found that because of Rule 4-
1.15's opt-out provision, participation in Missouri's IOLTA program was
"not required, compelled, or coerced by the State." ' This differentiated Mis-
souri's IOLTA program from Washington's mandatory IOLTA program,
addressed in Brown." 2 Accordingly, the court held that "the acts of deposit-
ing client funds into an IOLTA account and the subsequent transfer of interest
earned on the account to the Foundation are not attributable to the State."
113
Because Mottl failed to show that the alleged actions were fairly attributable
to the State, there was no state action, and the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of his petition.' '4
V. COMMENT
Mottl is important for many reasons. First, it is the first Missouri appel-
late case addressing the constitutionality of Missouri's IOLTA program. Sec-
ond, because Mottl joined as parties the judges of the Missouri Supreme
Court and because the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari,' 15 the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Western District is for now the final
authority on this issue in Missouri. Third, and probably most importantly, this
case switched liability for the deposit of a client's funds in an IOLTA account
and subsequent use by the Foundation from the state to private attorneys and
law firms around the state.
Because Mottl is the first Missouri appellate case to address the constitu-
tionality of Missouri's IOLTA program, it, along with the two prior United
States Supreme Court decisions, represents the only authority in Missouri on
108. Id.
109. Id.; see supra note 106 and accompanying text.
110. Mottl, 133 S.W.3d at 147 (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526
U.S. 40, 52-53 (1999); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. The court stated that the Supreme Court's finding in Brown that a private
attorney's mistaken deposit into an IOLTA account of funds that were capable of
earning net interest would destroy state action supports the holding that a Missouri
attorney's deposit of any client's funds in an IOLTA account destroys state action. Id.
at 147-48.
114. Id. at 148.
115. See Mottl v. Mo. Lawyer Trust Account Found., 125 S. Ct. 346 (2004).
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its IOLTA program. Related to this is the fact that the appellate court's deci-
sion in Mottl will not be reviewed by a higher court. Because Mottl joined as
defendants the judges of the Missouri Supreme Court, 116 the Supreme Court
judges are unable to review the Western District's decision.1 7 Mottl filed for
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court but was denied review." 8
Thus, until a challenge is brought that does not involve the judges of the Mis-
souri Supreme Court and that court decides to review it, Mottl represents
binding authority on the state action issue underlying a challenge to Mis-
souri's IOLTA program.
When combined with the prior holdings of the United States Supreme
Court concerning other states' IOLTA programs, the Western District's deci-
sion in Mottl effectively shifts liability for participation in Missouri's IOLTA
program from the state to private attorneys and law firms. In Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation,' '9 the United States Supreme Court held that
the interest income earned on funds deposited in IOLTA accounts is the pri-
vate property of the client because the client owns the principal. 120 In Brown
v. Legal Foundation of Washington,12 1 the United States Supreme Court held
that the just compensation due from the state on funds properly submitted
under Washington's IOLTA program is zero because the funds are incapable
of earning a net return on the interest accrued.'
22
Because Missouri's IOLTA program is substantially similar to Washing-
ton's programs, presumably the holding would be applicable to Missouri's
program. The holding in Mottl, however, makes the holding in Brown pertain-
ing to just compensation inapplicable to Missouri's IOLTA program. The
court held in Mottl that an attorney's participation in Missouri's IOLTA pro-
gram is voluntary and therefore not an action attributable to the State.'
23
Thus, the attorney, rather than the state, is ultimately responsible to the client
116. Mottl, 133 S.W.3d at 143-44.
117. According to the Missouri Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must recuse when
he or she is a party to the proceeding. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 2.03, Canon 3E(l)(d)(i). The
Code, however, allows for remittal of disqualifications by the terms of Canon 3E. Id. at
2.03, Canon 3F; see also Mo. REv. STAT. § 476.180 (2000) (no judge who is interested
in a suit may, without express consent of the parties, preside over a trial or determina-
tion thereof). Even with consent of the parties, it is doubtful that a judge who is a party
defendant could sit and try his or her own case. Kansas City v. Knotts, 78 Mo. 356, 359-
60 (1883). Thus, an appellate judge presumably also would be barred from reviewing a
case in which he or she is a party, even with the consent of the other parties.
118. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
119. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
120. Id. at 172.
121. 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
122. Id. at 239-40.
123. Mottl v. Mo. Lawyer Trust Account Found., 133 S.W.3d 142, 147 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 346 (2004).
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for the appropriation of the client's funds to the IOLTA program. 2 4 The fact
that no net interest is capable of being earned on client funds properly depos-
ited in IOLTA accounts does not save private attorneys or law firms who
subject their clients' funds to the Missouri IOLTA program.
Clients entrust their property to attorneys, and attorneys have a duty to no-
tify the client of, and promptly deliver to the client, funds and other property in
which the client has an interest.' 25 According to the United States Supreme
Court, the interest earned on client funds deposited in an IOLTA account is the
personal property of the client. 126 Thus, if an attorney or law firm deposits cli-
ent funds in an IOLTA account and such funds earn interest, the client must be
notified of such interest and the interest must be promptly delivered to the client
regardless of whether the interest earned has a positive economic value to the
client. 127 Because the interest is the client's property, the client has the right to
determine how the interest is disposed. 128 Presumably, the only logical reason a
client would decide to absorb the economic loss associated with delivery of the
interest is because of the client's fundamental disagreement with his or her
funds supporting the IOLTA program and the public services it funds.
Because an attorney must remit to the client the interest earned on his or
her funds, if the attorney deposits the client's funds in an IOLTA account
without the client's knowledge and tacit approval,129 the attorney thereby
appropriates the client's funds without client permission. In other words, the
attorney or firm has unilaterally taken the client's interest and donated it to
charity, thereby misappropriating the funds. 1
30
Because the court of appeals in Mottl found that the State does not com-
pel participation through Rule 4-1.15, 13 1 an attorney cannot merely remit the
client's interest to the Foundation under the impression that participation in
the program is mandated. The court found that state action did not exist be-
cause the voluntary nature of the program placed the decision to participate
124. See id. at 147. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution do
not apply to private action, nor does section 1983. See supra notes 46-52 and accom-
panying text.
125. MO. SuP. CT. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.15(b).
126. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998).
127. Id. at 170 ("While the interest income... may have no economically realiz-
able value to its owner, possession, control, and disposition are nonetheless valuable
rights that inhere in the property.").
128. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170.
129. The client's tacit approval would be through the client's decision to retain the
representation of an "IOLTA attorney." If a client informed of the attorney's volun-
tary participation in the IOLTA program retained the attorney, the client would, thus,
be agreeing to have the attorney donate the interest earned on the client nominal or
shortly-held funds to the Foundation.
130. See generally In re Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
131. Mottl v. Mo. Lawyer Trust Account Found., 133 S.W.3d 142, 147 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 346 (2004).
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"in the hands of the attorney or law firm and ultimately the client who selects
his attorney."' 32 The court's finding that the decision is ultimately in the
hands of the client assumes that the client's attorney or law firm informs the
client that the attorney or law firm's participation in the IOLTA program is
voluntary.133 If the attorney informs the client that the attorney participates in
the IOLTA program and that this participation is voluntary and explains the
effect of this participation on the client's funds, the client's subsequent reten-
tion of the attorney's services would be a tacit approval of the attorney's
transfer of any interest earned on funds subject to the IOLTA provisions to
the Foundation. However, if the attorney fails adequately to inform the client
before the client's retention of the attorney's services, the attorney is acting
unilaterally by remitting the client's interest to the Foundation and is thereby
misappropriating client funds.
If the attorney or law firm fails to gain the client's express or tacit ap-
proval to remit any IOLTA interest earned to the Foundation, the attorney or
firm could be liable for damages to the client. An attorney who fails to inform
the client of the attorney's IOLTA participation and who subjects those funds
to the IOLTA program would be exercising ownership rights over the prop-
erty of the client without permission. These actions satisfy the elements for
conversion.1 34 The interest proceeds from the deposit of a client's funds into
an IOLTA account are the property of the client;1 35 thus the first element of
conversion, establishing that the plaintiff is the owner of the property, 3 6 is
satisfied. By placing a client's funds into an IOLTA account knowing that the
interest would be diverted to the Foundation, the attorney would be taking
possession of the client's property and intentionally diverting it to the Foun-
dation, thereby satisfying the second element.' 37 These actions deprive the
132. Id. Individual clients of an attorney or law firm that participates in the IOLTA
program cannot elect not to have their funds subjected to the program if the clients re-
tain the participating attorney or firm. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. In
order to not have their funds subject to the program, clients would be required to find an
attorney or firm that does not participate in the program. See Mottl, 133 S.W.3d at 147.
133. This position is reinforced by the position that the Missouri Legal Ethics Coun-
sel took in an informal advisory opinion offered after the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation was rendered. See Missouri Legal
Ethics Counsel Informal Advisory Opinion Number 980201. In the opinion, Missouri
attorneys were advised that their participation in the Missouri IOLTA program should
be disclosed to clients whose funds may be deposited in IOLTA accounts. Id.
134. "Conversion is the unauthorized assumption and exercise of ownership rights
over the personal property of another party to the exclusion of the owner's rights."
lOS Capital, LLC v. Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp., 150 S.W.3d 148, 152-53
(Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
135. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998).
136. The first element of conversion is establishing that the plaintiff is the owner
of the property. 1OS Capital, 150 S.W.3d at 153.
137. The second element of conversion is the defendant's taking of possession of
the plaintiff's property intending to exercise control over it. Id.
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client of possession and control of her interest and the right to dispose of it
according to her wishes in satisfaction of the third element of conversion.
138
An action for conversion is appropriate when a person entrusted with
money for a specified purpose utilizes those funds for a purpose other than that
specified. 139 The actions of an attorney placing a client's funds into an IOLTA
account without the client's permission would meet this definition because the
attorney is entrusted with those funds so the attorney will hold them for the
purposes of advancing the client's interests. The attorney presumably would
hold the interest earned on those funds for the same purposes. 140 The attorney
holds the funds as a trustee for the client and must promptly remit the funds to
the client.14' By disbursing the interest to the Foundation without the client's
knowledge and approval, attorneys are diverting the interest with which they
are entrusted for purposes other than those specified by their clients. Thus, an
attorney who subjects a client's interest to the Missouri IOLTA plan without
the client's knowledge could be liable for conversion of the client's interest.
In addition to potential liability for conversion, the attorney could face
disciplinary sanctions. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that misappro-
priation or conversion of a client's funds is grounds for disbarment.' 4 The
penalty of disbarment, however, is normally invoked against attorneys who
steal client funds for their own purposes or who fail to properly account for
client funds. 143 Thus, arguably, disbarment would not be appropriate for an
attorney who subjects his client's nominal amount of interest to the IOLTA
program without permission. The Missouri Supreme Court, however, has
used harsh language which leaves the possibility of disbarment open for less
dubious conduct, stating that "[e]ven an unintentional mishandling of client
funds by an attorney can justify disbarment."' 44 Nevertheless, because dis-
barment has been characterized as "the ultimate sanction," 145 a possibility
138. The third element of conversion is the deprivation of the defendant's right to
possession of the property in question. Id.
139. Dillard v. Payne, 615 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Mo. 1981) (per curiam); see also supra
notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
140. The principle that "interest follows principal" would seemingly apply here.
See supra note 62.
141. See MO. SUP. CT. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4-1.15(b).
142. See In re Griffey, 873 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Mo. 1994) (en banc); In re
Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
143. See, e.g., Griffey, 873 S.W.2d at 602-03 (attorney disbarred in part for failing
to properly account for clients' funds, expending funds without clients' permission,
failing to inform clients of funds received, and fraudulently endorsing clients' checks
and depositing the checks in the attorney's operating account); Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d
at 5 (attorney disbarred in part for depositing client funds in account used by attorney
for attorney's own purposes).
144. Griffey, 873 S.W.2d at 603.
145. Schaeffer, 824 S.W.2d at 6.
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exists that an attorney would not be disbarred for participating in a program
the attorney felt was mandated by a Supreme Court Rule.
The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions support the conten-
tion that disbarment is not the appropriate remedy in such a circumstance.
The attorney's failure to inform the client of the attorney's participation in the
IOLTA program and the attorney's transfer of the client's interest to the
Foundation would probably rise to the level of negligence under the ABA
Standards, 146 because such conduct would likely deviate from the standard of
care a reasonable attorney would exercise in the situation.147 Additionally, the
client would suffer little or no actual monetary damages as a result of the
attorney's conduct because the client would essentially be losing a negative
amount of money. 43 Thus, pursuant to the ABA Standards, the appropriate
sanction would likely be a reprimand or an admonition.'
49
Now that Mottl has placed attorneys and law firms in the crosshairs for
potential liability and disciplinary sanctions, only two viable options exist for
the Missouri attorneys and firms to avoid such dire consequences. First, the
attorney can disclose that participation in the IOLTA program is voluntary
and that the attorney or firm participates in it before the client agrees to repre-
sentation. Second, the attorney or firm may decline to participate in the
IOLTA program altogether.
If the attorney or law firm elects to participate in the IOLTA program, the
attorney or law firm should properly inform a potential client of its voluntary
participation in the program during the initial consultation. 50 By so informing
the potential client, the attorney puts the decision to participate in the hands of
the client.' 51 The client can make an informed decision to participate by retain-
ing that attorney's services rather than seeking an attorney who does not par-
ticipate in the program. 52 The client's informed decision to be represented by
an "IOLTA attorney" would moot any issues of conversion or misappropriation
because of the client's consent to remit any interest generated to the Founda-
146. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
150. This is the position espoused by the Missouri Legal Ethics Commission, and
is something that the attorney or firm should have been doing anyway. See Missouri
Legal Ethics Counsel Informal Advisory Opinion Number 980201.
151. The court, in part, based the Mottl decision upon the premise that the client
makes an informed decision to participate in the IOLTA program when the client
chooses to be represented by an attorney who participates in the program. Mottl v.
Mo. Lawyer Trust Account Found., 133 S.W.3d 142, 147 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 346 (2004). However, this position assumes that some attorneys
have already opted out.
152. In additiod, the attorney can explain to the client the basic workings of the
IOLTA program and that the fees to deliver the interest earned on the client's funds
would outstrip the amount of the interest to be delivered.
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tion. Because this approach can be achieved quickly in the initial meeting with
the client, it seems to be the easier and more straightforward approach.
The other option would be for the attorney or law firm to opt-out of the
IOLTA program altogether. This can be achieved through the opt-out provi-
sion of Rule 4-1.15.153 Under this rule, an attorney or law firm may opt-out of
the program by notifying the Foundation in writing on or before January 31
of any year. 154 This would alleviate any potential misappropriation or conver-
sion problems because the attorney would not be remitting the client's inter-
est to the program at all. However, if this option is taken by a large number of
attorneys and law firms throughout the state, the effect on Missouri's IOLTA
program could be disastrous.
Rule 4-1.15 further provides that if the attorney or lai, firm fails to meet
the January 31 deadline, the attorney or law firm must maintain IOLTA ac-
counts for the year. 155 Thus, once a firm or sole practitioner has decided to
opt-out of the program, there may be a period of lag-time where the attorney
or law firm will still be required to maintain an IOLTA account. During this
period, an attorney should inform the client about the attorney's voluntary
participation in the program, as previously discussed, to avoid any conversion
or misappropriation problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Mottl court's holding that an attorney's participation in Missouri's
IOLTA program is not conduct attributable to the state has far-reaching ef-
fects for practitioners and the future of the IOLTA program. The holding has
made attorneys and law firms who fail to inform a client of their voluntary
participation in the Missouri IOLTA program liable to their clients for con-
version of any interest earned on those clients' funds that are remitted to the
Foundation pursuant to the program. Additionally, attorneys are subject to
discipline for misappropriation of client funds. The holding could detrimen-
tally impact the IOLTA program as a whole because the attorneys and law
firms may simply opt-out of the program instead of addressing the issues
surrounding the placement of client funds in IOLTA accounts with each cli-
ent before retention. If enough attorneys and law firms opt-out of participa-
tion, it could have a devastating effect on a program that serves the public
good throughout Missouri.
TIMOTHY D. STEFFENS
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